Chapter 5

The Need for Peace and Security

Summary

The right to life and security is the most basic of human rights. Without **increased investment in conflict prevention**, Africa will not make the rapid acceleration in development that its people seek. Investing in development is itself an investment in peace and security, but there is much more that should be done directly to strengthen conflict prevention:

- Building the **capacity of African states and societies to prevent and manage conflict** by tackling its root causes, including steps to make aid more effective at building the foundations for durable peace, to improve the management of natural resource revenues, and to tackle the trade in small arms and 'conflict resources';
- Strengthening **African regional organisations' and the UN's ability to prevent and resolve conflict through, for example, more effective early warning, mediation and peacekeeping.** We propose to do this by providing flexible funding for African Union and regional organisations' core capacity and operations; and by supporting the creation of a new UN Peacebuilding Commission;
- Improving the co-ordination and financing of **post-conflict peacebuilding and development**, so that states emerging from violent conflict do not slide back into it.

A full list of the Commission's recommendations on Peace and Security can be found at the end of this chapter.

1 Few Africans can afford to share the view that preventing conflict in Africa is a lost cause.

2 Violent conflict has killed and displaced more people in Africa than in any other continent in recent decades. This has driven poverty and exclusion, undermined growth and development, and deprived many of their right to life, liberty, and security as enshrined in Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights[1].

3 Our consultations in Africa show that there is a strong desire to see greater action to prevent the emergence, spread and re-emergence of violent conflict[2]. Responsibility for peace and security lies primarily with African governments but the Commission is clear that the actions of developed countries are essential to making this desire a reality. The developed world's trade, economic and development policies, and its participation in the trade in small arms and 'conflict resources', have contributed to Africa's instability. Developed countries have, to date, consistently prioritised reaction over prevention. Often, this reaction has been 'too little, too late'. Reactive military or humanitarian measures are necessary to prevent the further loss of life in emergencies, but even at their most successful can only control a situation not resolve it. Investment in other tools, such as development, African national and regional capacity to manage conflict, mediation, and

peacebuilding, is needed to ensure existing conflicts are resolved as well as future ones prevented. Without such investment, the demand for reactive measures, such as military intervention, can only increase.

4 Now is a prime opportunity for the international community to change its approach in support of African efforts to promote peace and security. Some African leaders and governments have neglected the security of their populations and used division and violence for their own political goals. And, as the crisis in Darfur shows, there are still huge problems on the continent. But the past few years have seen some progress towards greater peace and security in Africa, and a growing political will from African governments and organisations to take the lead in promoting peace and security on the continent. There have been tentative and varying steps towards ending some of the continent's worst civil wars, such as those in Angola, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Somalia, and Sudan. The African Union (AU) has moved towards putting the concept of 'non-indifference', which recognises the responsibility of member states to promote human security, into practice. Regional organisations, such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), have taken an active role in responding to instability in their regions.

5 The process of taking forward the UN High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change[3] (UNHLP) recommendations in 2005 is a crucial opportunity for the international community to take action on many of the issues raised in this chapter.

6 Part of the reason developed countries have failed to prioritise prevention in the past has been the 'CNN factor': the high profile given to some emergencies by the media puts strong pressure on the international community to respond to them – and provides political rewards for doing so. Mechanisms to promote scrutiny, measurement, and accountability for commitments made by developed countries (see Chapter 10) are therefore essential to generating the pressure needed to implement the recommendations in this chapter.

5.1 The case for prevention

7 **African and developed countries should invest in the prevention of violent conflict in Africa.** Conflict prevention can be defined as action to stop the emergence, spread and re-occurrence of violent conflict[4].

8 Prevention is vital for a number of reasons. First, violent conflict causes huge human suffering and denies many Africans their most basic right to life and security. As illustrated by Figure 5.1, violent conflict has killed more people in Africa than in any other continent in recent decades.

9 Africa also has by far the highest level of forced displacement in the world:13 million internally displaced people (IDPs) and 3.5 million refugees, more than twice the absolute number in Asia, which has more than five times the population[5].

10 Much of this death and displacement is a result of the long and brutal civil wars that have affected many African countries. It is estimated that four million people have died as a direct or indirect result of the civil war and continuing insecurity in the DRC since 1998[6]. This is the largest death toll from a war since World War II[7]. Coups, political instability and localised outbreaks of violence have affected many other countries. In Nigeria, for example, between 1999 and 2003 at least 10,000 people lost their lives in ongoing localised violence and short-lived but vicious communal fighting[8]. A widespread lack of effective policing and legal systems contributes to violent crime and insecurity in many more places. Those who suffer most are the poor and the vulnerable, including many women and children recruited, often by force, into armed groups as child soldiers, porters, or sex slaves[9].

11 Second, violent conflict and insecurity severely undermine development. It increases poverty; reduces growth[10], trade, and investment; and destroys vital infrastructure[11] and 'human capital' through death, injury, and displacement. Violent conflict encourages high levels of military expenditure, diverting resources away from development[12]. Violent conflict helps spread malnutrition and infectious diseases, including HIV and AIDS, through breakdown in services, the rapid movement of refugees and IDPs, and the use of rape as a weapon of war[13].

12 Third, violent conflicts, once sparked, can create intractable and ongoing tensions that are very difficult to resolve. Violence deepens the poverty, inequality and economic stagnation that can cause violent conflict. The damage and destruction of health and education systems perpetuates the inequalities and exclusion that fuel tensions. Displacement of large numbers of people has fuelled the rapid growth of cities, such as Kinshasa[14], creating further potential problems. The breakdown in institutions, social and cultural structures, and the trauma created by violence and displacement, deepens resentment and divisions, increasing the risk of future conflict. Thus, countries that have experienced a civil war have an increased likelihood of violence in the future[15]. Furthermore, violence in one country can drive instability in neighbouring countries, and increases the pressure on neighbours' resources through refugee flows. By weakening states, internal strife can provide an enabling environment for international terrorist organisations.

13 Fourth, reacting to conflict is more expensive for the international community than preventing it. If the international community reacts to a crisis, it tends to be through deployment of peacekeepers or humanitarian assistance[16]. This is expensive. The budget for

UN peacekeeping operations in Africa from July 2004 to June 2005 is US$2.86 billion[17]. Africa received around US$7 billion in humanitarian aid between 1995 and 2001, and four of the top ten countries receiving such aid globally were African[18], much of it in response to violent conflict. Reconstruction is also expensive: it has been estimated that the reconstruction of DRC alone will cost US$20 billion[19]. It is not surprising, therefore, that a number of studies have shown that conflict prevention is much more cost-effective than reaction[20]. One estimate is that it would have cost the international community US$1.5 billion to prevent the conflict in Somalia compared with the US$7.3 billion it cost to respond[21].

14 Many agree that prevention is desirable, but argue that it is not possible. There is evidence to suggest the opposite. Studies have estimated that in the second half of the 1990s the world would have seen 25 per cent more violent conflict had it not been for preventive measures, involving both domestic and international action[22]. Other studies show that more could have been done to avert major crises. As with many of Africa's major conflicts, there were clear signals of the risk of serious conflict in Rwanda, such as deepening economic crisis and rising ethnic tension and violence, long before the genocide in 1994. There were specific and detailed warnings of impending genocide closer to the event. A package of prevention measures – such as greater support for the implementation of peace agreements, combined with economic support to alleviate the impact of the economic crisis – could have reduced the chances of Rwandan genocide by up to 50 per cent[23].

15 The rest of this chapter shows that there are many opportunities for increasing investment in prevention by: addressing the root causes of violent conflict and building the capacity of African societies to manage conflict; improving the capacity of regional, continental and international organisations to prevent and resolve conflict; and ensuring peace is maintained in countries emerging from violent conflict.

16 At all levels, actors should promote the full implementation of UN Resolution 1325 (2000) on the role of women in peace processes and the impact of armed conflict on women and girls[24].

5.2 Building peaceful African societies

17 As Figure 5.1 shows, Africa has not always experienced such high levels of conflict. Violence erupts when societies' mechanisms for managing disputes and tensions break down – or are unable to cope with the problem. Thus, the rise in violent conflict in recent decades is a result of growing sources of tension alongside a low and declining capacity to manage them in many parts of Africa.

18 Addressing the sources of conflict and strengthening the capacity to manage them is the only way to build durable peace[25]. This needs to be led by African actors, but developed countries need to play their part by tackling the negative impact of their policies and behaviour on the level of tension, and devoting more resources to reducing tensions and to strengthening conflict management mechanisms.

19 Investing in development, growth and job creation, including through fairer trade policies, is essential to reducing violent conflict in Africa. Studies suggest that 'doubling per capita income approximately halves the risk of rebellion' and 'each additional percentage point on the growth rate reduces the risk of rebellion by approximately one percentage point'[26]. High unemployment, particularly among the young, means that violence can offer economic opportunities not found elsewhere[27]. The large number of children orphaned as a result of violent conflict and AIDS is likely to add to this pool of disaffected youth.

20 However, development and growth that do not address inequality and exclusion will not reduce violent conflict. Inequality and exclusion are central causes of violent

conflict[28]. Unequal access to political offices, basic services, and economic opportunities has created tensions between communities in many African countries. Group identities, such as ethnicity or religion, come into play in the competition for power and resources[29] – and provide the principal dividing line for many conflicts. The DRC and Rwanda are just two examples where ethnic tensions over access to political power have resulted in major conflicts.

21 Countries with economies dependent on one or a few primary commodities, particularly high-value resources such as oil and other minerals, are often poor, have weak and less accountable governance systems[30], and are more vulnerable to violent conflict and economic shocks[31]. Creating much greater transparency about who owns resources and who has access to them, as well as greater openness about the amount and allocation of the revenues generated, is crucial to making these countries less susceptible to violent conflict.

22 The income from the trade in 'conflict resources' has been used to finance wars. 'Conflict resources' are resources, such as oil, diamonds, timber or coltan[32], the revenues from which enable warring parties to continue their activities - for example, by buying arms. Gaining access to such riches encourages coups and rebellions, and can become the reason for continuing hostilities. Sometimes, money is raised not through selling the actual resources, but by using anticipated revenues to access loans or other forms of finance[33]. Where the extraction and selling of natural resources form an important part of the war economy, wars tend to last longer and are more difficult to resolve[34] – as has been the case in, for example, Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and the DRC. This is linked to the illicit arms trade, clandestine transport systems, money laundering, and criminal networks[35].

23 Tension over access to land, grazing rights, water, forests, fishing stocks, and other vital resources has also played a central role in violent conflict in Africa. Conflict between herders and cultivators over access to land creates localised violence in many parts of Africa, but can also often stretch across borders and lead to larger conflicts. For example, such disputes contributed to the current violence in Darfur, Sudan. In Côte d'Ivoire, growing local tensions over land use, linked to migration and national identity, contributed to national instability. Shared water resources can lead to tensions between countries, as in the Nile Basin (see Chapter 7) and elsewhere, and access to valuable mineral resources fuels fighting in the Great Lakes region.

24 The proliferation of small arms and other light weapons (SALW) is another factor that needs to be addressed. In parts of Africa, AK-47 Kalashnikov assault rifles can be bought for as little as US$6[36]. The availability of this weaponry is not in itself a cause of instability, but has increased the duration of conflicts and made them more lethal. It is estimated that SALW are implicated in more than 300,000 deaths each year, primarily in the world's poorest countries[37]. SALW are also used in violent crime[38] and human rights violations.

25 Actual conflicts are often sparked by specific events or crises: controversial elections, political crises, coups and the actions of political leaders, or the impact of economic shocks and policies[39]. At times, such factors have come from neighbouring countries – for example, refugees and armed combatants from the Rwandan genocide contributed to violence in eastern DRC. The movement of arms over borders, and direct support for rebellions from neighbouring governments can also fuel internal conflicts[40].

26 Governance can be a deciding factor in whether or not a country experiences violent conflict[41]. The state is responsible for ensuring security for its people. Many African states struggled to develop their legitimacy and capacity following independence, dealing with the legacy of colonial policies and the impact of the policies of Cold War powers. A number of the factors that drive violent conflict – such as poverty, resource dependence, and the

proliferation of small arms – have also undermined states' conflict management capacity. Numerous African countries have avoided civil war and major conflicts[42], despite being subject to most of the underlying factors that drive violent conflict elsewhere. But many other African states have failed to manage conflict or provide security for their population, and many have a very low capacity to manage conflict. Some leaders and governments have been directly implicated in causing violent conflicts by neglecting the security of their people and pursuing power through violent means.

27 Building effective and accountable states that represent and respond to the needs of their population is therefore essential to improving the peaceful management of conflict. At the same time, local communities are often the primary actors in conflict management, through formal, traditional and religious dispute resolution mechanisms. The role of women is receiving increasing recognition, as is the necessity of involving other key actors, including the young. Such 'grassroots' mechanisms also need to be understood and supported.

28 All the themes addressed in this report have a key role to play in addressing the causes of conflict and building local and national capacity to manage conflict – by promoting inclusive and effective governance and a strong civil society; development, trade, growth and economic diversification; addressing exclusion through human development and participation; and action to reduce the impact of economic crises. We identify some other steps vital to conflict prevention below.

5.2.1 Making aid better at reducing violent conflict and promoting security

Recommendation: To make aid more effective at reducing conflict, all donors, the international financial institutions, and the United Nations should be required to use assessments of how to reduce the risk of violent conflict and improve human security in formulating their country and regional assistance strategies[43]. This commitment should be made at the UN Millennium Review Summit in September 2005, and implementation monitored and evaluated through the DAC Peer Review and other mechanisms.

29 Development assistance offers the opportunity to address the root causes of violent conflict by promoting growth, poverty reduction, and addressing exclusion and inequalities. However, development assistance that reinforces the root causes of violent conflict, such as exclusion and inequality and poor governance, or ignores them, is likely to make matters worse. For example, aid that strengthens unaccountable leaders or governments that exclude certain ethnic or religious groups fuels the root causes of violent conflict. In pre-genocide Rwanda, development assistance reinforced ethnic tensions[44]. Individual projects and programmes have also caused trouble by reinforcing or exacerbating existing inequalities at local level[45].

30 The problem is that development actors often fail to acknowledge that their aid policies and funds are not neutral: they have a political impact even if their objectives are economically or developmentally sound. They can also fail to understand and act upon the realities of the countries in which they operate. For example, major donors to Côte d'Ivoire, Rwanda, and Zaire in the 1990s ignored the clear signs of impending instability. Furthermore, support for conflict management and the reform of the security and justice sectors (including policing) is not generally given priority, despite evidence that security is essential to development. The absence of sufficient support to such programmes has been particularly detrimental to post-conflict peacebuilding. Without support to security sector reform and policing at the national level, there will not be the necessary basic capacity for peacekeeping.

31 Some limited steps have been taken to address these problems. Many of the organisations mentioned in the recommendation above have developed conflict assessment tools. There has also been some increase in donor support for conflict prevention and security and justice sector reform programmes[46]. Some development programmes have also been adapted to address conflict issues. For example, the World Bank, finding that one of its agricultural programmes was directly contributing to conflict between farmers and cattle herders in northern Nigeria, used conflict analysis to improve the second phase of its programme to include support for local conflict management mechanisms[47].

32 However, progress is still very limited, and often confined to programmes in countries already experiencing conflict rather than those that might be at risk. Conflict assessments, if conducted, are often not converted into action.

33 Little more can be achieved without promoting a fundamental change in the way security and the causes of conflict are treated in development policies and programmes. Requiring better analysis of the risks of violent conflict and the current state of human security in formulating country and regional assistance strategies would ensure that these issues are given the attention they require as a matter of course. The assessments should focus on potential risks arising from inequality, for example, as well as on existing conflicts. They need to look at how to promote security from low-level violence and crime as well as averting the threat of major violent conflicts, including through increased support to more effective justice systems and better policing.

34 Increased awareness and sensitivity is needed from all donors. Some organisations - such as the UN, EU and certain bilateral donors – may have a greater role to play in providing direct support to security sector reform or conflict prevention. Others, such as the international financial institutions (IFIs), need to focus more on the impact of their core programmes rather than developing new activities. The regional dimension to many conflicts in Africa means that strategies at that level have a particular role to play. At the regional and national level, civil society and grassroots initiatives to reduce violence must be supported.

35 Member states should also support UN reforms aimed at establishing a strong working relationship between UN security and development actors, as proposed by the UNHLP[48]. AU/NEPAD proposals to map exclusion also provide an important entry point for improving the impact of development assistance on the causes of conflict in Africa (see Chapter 6).

5.2.2 Arms control

Recommendation: As a matter of priority and no later than 2006, the international community should open negotiations on an international Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)[49].

Recommendation: The international community must also adopt more effective and legally-binding agreements on territorial and extra-territorial arms brokering[50], and common standards on monitoring and enforcement. These agreements could be integrated into a comprehensive ATT.

36 There are a number of significant gaps in the current control agreements on small arms and light weapons (SALW) and some significant barriers to effective implementation – and many countries, companies, and brokers are exploiting these. For example, despite steps taken by the international community to limit the flow of arms to Sudan during the crisis in Darfur some countries and brokers continue to export arms to the country, including those that can be used for internal repression or war. Several of the largest manufacturers, exporters, and brokers of arms to Africa are to be found in G8 and EU countries[51]. This means that if there is political will in these countries, control agreements and other measures can have an impact.

37 There are signs that an increasing number of states recognise the need for more effective action to counter arms proliferation. In Africa, for example, some regional organisations are ratifying tighter or legally-binding arms control agreements[52], and many African governments are trying to improve the control of weapons already in circulation in their countries. Globally, support for an ATT as an international legal framework and an avenue for coherent action against arms proliferation in countries at risk of instability is growing[53]. An ATT would establish an unequivocal international legal mechanism to prevent arms transfers when they are likely to be used in violent conflict, human rights abuses, terrorism, or for other serious abuses contrary to international law.

38 In 2005, a priority for both the G8 and EU should be building consensus behind the idea of an ATT and developing criteria for such a treaty. In addition to improving the control of legal transfers, an agreement on common brokering controls would be an important step forward. In 2006, the UN Small Arms Review Conference offers an important opportunity to set international guidelines on arms transfers, trafficking and brokering.

39 Arms brokers play a major role in supplying weapons to African conflict zones. A succession of UN reports into sanctions busting have highlighted the role of these middle-men. A number of countries, such as the US, Belgium, Estonia and Finland, have broad controls on brokering, including extra-territorial activities, but elsewhere controls are weak and often do not cover extra-territorial aspects.

40 There is evidence that the transport of illicit weapons to and within Africa continues by sea, air, and land[54]. G8 and EU governments should take the lead in encouraging stricter controls and better monitoring and enforcement of existing regulations. Transport regulations could be tightened through the creation of a registration scheme for transportation agents such as international white/blacklists of companies, or through more assertive monitoring of the rules on aircraft insurance. This will only be effective if a concerted effort is made to strengthen international information-sharing and if monitoring is approached more pro-actively.

41 Donor countries should also support African governments in strengthening national and regional capacity to monitor compliance, enforce existing rules, and deal with existing stockpiles through practical and sufficiently funded SALW programmes. Furthermore, they must actively promote the integration of SALW and mine clearance programmes into regional peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction efforts.

5.2.3 Management of natural resources

Recommendation: To speed up action to control the trade in natural resources that fund wars, the international community should:

- **agree a common definition for 'conflict resources', for global endorsement through the United Nations;**
- **create a permanent Expert Panel within the UN to monitor the links between natural resource extraction and violent conflict, and the implementation of sanctions. The panel should be empowered to recommend enforcement measures to the UN Security Council.**

42 In Chapter 4, we propose several ways in which governance of natural resource wealth can be strengthened, including support for the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and extending transparency principles to other natural resources sectors like forestry and fisheries. These recommendations are also designed to address the role of natural resources in conflict in Africa. Therefore, **to weaken the link between natural resources and violent conflict in Africa, the international community should support the recommendations on increased transparency set out in Chapter 4.**

43 The international community has a number of instruments available to obstruct the trade in 'conflict resources' – resources being used to finance wars – including targeted sanctions against persons, products or regimes, certification schemes, and the creation of Expert Panels to investigate illicit commercial activities in conflict zones. An example of an international response to the abuse of natural resources to fuel and fund war is the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, an initiative in which governments, industry, and NGOs joined together to stem the flow of 'conflict diamonds'[55].

44 More effective action to obstruct the trade in conflict resources is hampered by the fact that there is as yet no internationally recognised definition of such resources[56]. This means that each commodity, and each instance of misuse, has to be dealt with separately, on an *ad hoc* basis. It took two years and several UN resolutions to establish the Kimberley Process[57]. A common definition of conflict resources with clear criteria for when resources become conflict resources would remove the need for separate schemes on individual commodities[58]. International measures designed to stop the trade in conflict resources can then kick into action as soon as there is convincing evidence that revenues from extraction of a particular resource in a specific country are being diverted towards funding violent conflict. The international community should prioritise, and fund, the process of agreeing a common definition of conflict resources. The definition could eventually be incorporated into a UN Security Council or General Assembly resolution, to maximise its international impact.

45 Another obstacle is a lack of political will to ensure that international sanctions are enforced, and to punish sanctions busters. The monitoring and enforcement of recommendations by Expert Panels is also often weak[59]. In recognition of these problems, the UNHLP has suggested a number of steps that the international community should take to improve the effectiveness of sanctions[60]. (See Annex 1 for the text of the UNHLP's recommendation on sanctions.) The international community should support the implementation of these measures to improve the efficiency of international sanctions.

46 The monitoring and enforcement of sanctions can be improved by establishing a permanent body attached to the UN Security Council with standing capacity to investigate and sanction malfeasance[61]. The UN Expert Panels established in recent years have faced significant bureaucratic and logistical hurdles when being set up, and only had temporary mandates[62]. A permanent Expert Panel would make it possible to retain the institutional knowledge essential to conduct investigations, and would be able to respond more rapidly to complex, highly-changeable conflict situations. This permanent body could also be tasked with investigating the links between natural resources and violent conflict.

5.2.4 Corporate activity in conflict areas

Recommendation: OECD countries should promote the development and full implementation of clear and comprehensive guidelines for companies operating in areas at risk of violent conflict, for incorporation into the OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises.

47 One of the negative impacts of instability is reduced foreign and domestic investment. Chapter 7 includes proposals to help counter this through a guaranteed fund for investors in conflict-affected countries.

48 However, while this investment is often desperately needed, companies that are actively engaged in such countries can also have a negative effect on peace and security. By using disreputable private security companies or co-opting armed groups to protect installations, multinationals have contributed to wider insecurity[63]. Another disruptive factor can be hiring disproportionate numbers of people from one socio-economic or ethnic group, or providing

'development assistance' to particular communities[64]. In other cases, companies are more directly involved in fuelling war by, for example, paying substantial sums to governments or warlords and helping oppressive or corrupt regimes to remain in power. Sometimes these payments go directly to financing conflict. Some firms are even involved in arms trafficking[65].

49 Many such actions are in breach of international laws[66]. But many unhelpful acts are not actually crimes and cannot be controlled using existing channels of regulation. The regulatory gap is currently filled by various standards and codes for behaviour, such as the OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises[67]. Although voluntary, OECD governments are obliged to promote and ensure adherence to the guidelines[68]. The G8 has already committed to 'encouraging the adoption of voluntary principles of corporate social responsibility by those involved in developing Africa's natural resources'[69]. That obligation now needs to be implemented.

50 However, existing guidelines make inadequate provision for economic activity in areas at risk of, or actively engaged in, violent conflict. Corporate guidelines need to be revised with conflict zones in mind, setting out the best current practice on security arrangements, transparency, and revenue-sharing arrangements. Such guidelines should be aimed at helping companies to avoid the potential risks to their own business of operating in such environments, and thus allow them to invest with greater confidence. They should set out the importance of using conflict analysis and risk assessments to avoid creating or worsening conflicts. The mechanisms for implementation of the OECD Guidelines through National Contact Points (NCPs) should be strengthened, for example through establishing NCPs in resource-rich African countries, as recommended by participants at the Commission's regional consultations. In addition, as highlighted in Chapter 4, shareholders can exercise their considerable influence to ensure that codes and standards are adhered to and consumers also have substantial power to persuade companies to adopt ethical policies.

51 Guidelines alone, of course, will not be enough. A body will be needed to monitor their effectiveness, with clear disincentives for non-compliance[70]. This could be another function for the **permanent Expert Panel within the UN Security Council** charged with overseeing various issues relating to conflict resources and their trade, which we recommend above. This body should also be charged with ensuring that companies do not circumvent guidelines by taking a deliberately narrow interpretation of them[71]. It could also play a role in monitoring the activities of businesses not registered in OECD countries.

5.3 Building regional and global capacity to prevent and resolve violent conflict: early warning, mediation and peacekeeping

52 When local or national mechanisms fail, regional and international organisations have a key role in preventing and resolving violent conflict, and protecting the lives of civilians.

53 Throughout the world, regional integration and organisations have played a role in promoting peace and security. For example, the creation and expansion of the European Union has been seen as a force for stability in Europe. In 2001 the EU, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and NATO made a variety of interventions, including preventive peacekeeping and mediation, that helped to avert an escalation in conflict in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia[72].

54 Continental and regional efforts are playing an increasingly important role in building peace and security in Africa. At the continental level, the AU has created a Peace and Security Council and the protocol establishing this outlines plans to create a

Annex 2: Recommendation on the Peacebuilding Commission and Peace Support Office, Article XV,

A more secure world: our shared responsibility: Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change.

We recommend that the Security Council, acting under Article 29 of the Charter of the United Nations and after consultation with the Economic and Social Council, establish a Peacebuilding Commission.

The core functions of the Peacebuilding Commission should be to identify countries which are under stress and risk sliding towards State collapse; to organise, in partnership with the national Government, proactive assistance in preventing that process from developing further; to assist in the planning for transitions between conflict and post-conflict peacebuilding; and in particular to marshal and sustain the efforts of the international community in post–conflict peacebuilding over whatever period may be necessary.

While the precise composition, procedures, and reporting lines of the Peacebuilding Commission will need to be established, they should take account of the following guidelines:

(a) The Peacebuilding Commission should be reasonably small;

(b) It should meet in different configurations, to consider both general policy issues and country-by-country strategies;

(c) It should be chaired for at least one year and perhaps longer by a member approved by the Security Council;

(d) In addition to representation from the Security Council, it should include representation from the Economic and Social Council;

(e) National representatives of the country under consideration should be invited to attend;

(f) The Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, the President of the World Bank and, when appropriate, heads of regional development banks should be represented at its meetings by appropriate senior officials;

(g) Representatives of the principal donor countries and, when appropriate, the principal troop contributors should be invited to participate in its deliberations;

(h) Representatives of regional and subregional organisations should be invited to participate in its deliberations when such organisations are actively involved in the country in question.

Peacebuilding Support Office

A Peacebuilding Support Office should be established in the Secretariat to give the Peacebuilding Commission appropriate Secretariat support and to ensure that the Secretary-General is able to integrate system – wide peacebuilding policies and strategies, develop best practices and provide cohesive support for field operations.

The Office should comprise about 20 or more staff of different backgrounds in the United Nations system and with significant experience in peacebuilding strategy and operations. In addition to supporting the Secretary-General and the Peacebuilding Commission, the Office could also, on request, provide assistance and advice to the heads of peace operations, United Nations resident co-ordinators or national Governments – for example in developing strategies for transitional political arrangements or building new State institutions. It should submit twice-yearly early warning analyses to the Peacebuilding Commission to help it in organising its work.

The Peacebuilding Support Office should also maintain rosters of national and international experts, particularly those with experience in post-conflict cases.

The Office should have an inter-agency advisory board, headed by the Chair of the United Nations Development Group, that would ensure that the Office worked in effective co-